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Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- FORGED CONSENSUS -- Chapter 1. The Malleability of American Liberalism and the Making of Public Policy -- Chapter 2. The Republican Ascendancy and the Crash: Associative Undercurrents in a Conservative Era, 1921-1932 -- Chapter 3. Trial and Error: Science, Technology, and Economic Policy in the First Roosevelt Administration, 1933-1936 -- Chapter 4. Breaking Bottlenecks and Blockades: The Heyday of Reform Liberalism, 1937-1940, and Its Postwar Consequences -- Chapter 5. Old Fights, New Accommodations: Wartime Experiments and the Demise of Reform Liberalism, 1940-1945 -- Chapter 6. Groping toward Management: Science, Technology, and Macroand Microeconomic Policy, 1945-1950 -- Chapter 7. "The Crescendo of Hideous Invention": The National Security State Comes of Age, 1945-1953 -- Chapter 8. The Past in the Present: The "Hybrid" in the Cold War and Beyond -- Bibliography -- Index

Anthony de Jasay, like many free-market economists before him, is concerned that popularity held fallacies about the way markets operate are very dangerous and need to be countered by economists. Most do so by writing scholarly hooks and journal articles, but such materials are not read by the educated public, let alone the nonacademic public. Hence, many economists feel the need to 'reach out' by writing more popular pieces, which they publish in newspapers or blogs, or by making themselves available for radio and TV interviews in the hope that their 'sound bites' in favor of the free market will drown out the cacophony of chomping that goes on in favor of government intervention and regulation. Free-market voices very occasionally rise above the din of interventionist dining either because they are able to capture the popular imagination, at least for a moment, or because of the sheer quality of what they have to say and the way they say it. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract"Entrepreneurial" economic development strategies at the state level in the United States, which focus on nurturing home‐grown, high‐growth businesses, lack immediate payoffs for politically powerful constituencies, a condition that would seem likely to limit their appeal compared to the alternative "locational" strategy of attracting large investments from elsewhere. Nonetheless, many U.S. states have added programs with entrepreneurial attributes to their economic development portfolios in recent years. This paper explores how the political obstacles to such programs have been overcome. In a few cases, an institutional innovation in the policy‐making process drew in new participants who provided ideas for and support to programs with entrepreneurial attributes. More commonly, the preferences of executive branch officials, especially governors, appear to have been critical to the enactment and implementation of such programs. This finding suggests that economic development policy making may be more technocratic than is commonly believed.